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Weiner: Particularity and Precision in Texas Indictments and Informations

COMMENTS
PARTICULARITY AND PRECISION IN TEXAS
INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATIONS:
WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT?
DAVID WEINER
In a criminal proceeding the indictment and the information serve to
invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court and to apprise the accused of the
nature of the charges against him.' Pursuant to the Texas Constitution,2
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the requisites of indictments; the same requisites are applicable to informations.' The fundamental requirement is that the indictment or the information allege every
element that must be proved to constitute the offense charged.' Failure to
allege an essential element of an offense5 is a jurisdictional defect rendering
the indictment fundamentally defective and therefore void.'
Many instances of fundamentally defective indictments involve a complete omission from the indictment of words capable of alleging an essential element of an offense.7 Yet, even when an indictment contains words
which arguably allege an essential element, failure to allege the element
with sufficient precision8 or particularity' may constitute a fundamental
1. See Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (en banc) (information); Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (concurring opinion)
(indictment).
2. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. See Tax. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 21.02-.24 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1978). The rules
of indictments are made applicable to informations in art. 21.23.
4. Tax. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1966).
5. See TFx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(13) (Vernon 1974) (meaning of "element of an
offense").
6. See, e.g., Zachery v. State, 552 S.W.2d 136, 137-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment); Tave v. State, 546 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (information); Standley
v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (indictment).
7. See, e.g., Ex parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (burglary
indictment fundamentally defective for omission of culpable mental state); Williams v. State,
524 S.W.2d 73, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (aggravated robbery indictment fundamentally
defective for omission of injury allegation); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975) (indictment for conversion of property by bailee fundamentally defective
for omission of property value allegation).
8. The court of criminal appeals has not used the term "precision" to describe the issue
discussed under that term in this comment. The term is useful to denote the general principle,
and the problems incident to it, that the exact statutory words need not be used to constitute
a valid indictment or information. See McClane v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 603, 605-06, 343
S.W.2d 447, 449 (1960) (authorizing substitution of equivalent words); Tax. CODE CrIM. PRo.
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defect in the indictment."0 Generally, questions of precision involve the
narrow problem of whether words used in an indictment are sufficiently
similar in meaning to specific statutory language." In contrast, questions
of particularity encompass a greater number of problems, all of which deal
with the question of whether it is sufficient to allege an offense merely by
following, or tracking, the language of the statute."
The existence of a material distinction between cases involving insufficient particularity or precision in pleading, on the one hand, and completely omitted elements, on the other, is more apparent than real. Frequently, decisions which are ultimately framed in terms of omission of
allegations from indictments actually involve questions of precision."
ANN. art. 21.17 (Vernon 1966) (exact words defining offense not required in indictment). See

also WE STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1784 (14th ed. 1963) ("precise" means
"devoid of anything vague, equivocal, or uncertain").
9. The term "particularity" denotes the need to go beyond specific statutory language
in alleging an offense. See Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 132-33 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977); Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1275 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("particulars" are "the details of a claim").
10. See, e.g., Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)
(on motion for rehearing) (precision); Richard v. State, 563 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (particularity); Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (precision and particularity).
11. See, e.g., Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en
banc) ("attempt" includes "intent"); Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) ("promise" does not mean "employ"); Sims v. State, 546 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) ("pistol" equivalent to "handgun"). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
contains provisions for construction of words used in indictments. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. art. 21.12 (Vernon 1966) (use of general terms for special terms); id. art. 21.17 (no need
to use exact words defining offense).
12. Typical questions of particularity include whether an allegation of a statutory element must be accompanied by its statutory definition, whether it is necessary to allege or
describe facts sufficient to aver an essential element, and whether a required property description is sufficient. See Richard v. State, 563 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(property); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (facts); Baldwin v.
State, 538 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (definition). The
particularity category is broad enough to include the question of the need to allege a specific
intent or other culpable mental state not set forth in the definition of an offense. See Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (other culpability); Slavin v. State,
548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (specific intent). See generally TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 6.02 (Vernon 1974).
Perhaps the most famous example of a case where an indictment was held fundamentally
defective for insufficient particularity is the "kicking and stomping" case. See Northern v.
State, 150 Tex. Crim. 511, 513, 203 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1947). In that case the court held that a
murder indictment which alleged the defendant killed the victim by "kicking and stomping"
was fundamentally defective for failure to allege that the defendant kicked and stomped
"with his feet with shoes on .... " Id. at 512-13, 203 S.W.2d at 207-08. Later decisions have
severely criticized the Northern holding. See Alobaidi v. State, 433 S.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 943 (1968); Riley v. State, 379 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1964) (concurring opinion).
13. See, e.g., Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 813-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)
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Moreover, questions of particularity are a specialized and complicated
type of omissions problem." When viewed from the perspective of precision
and particularity, the law pertaining to defective indictments is characterized by greater complexity than when viewed from the perspective of omission. 5
The law dealing with particularity and precision in indictments is
changing rapidly as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals strives to coordinate established standards of indictment sufficiency with the intricate
substantive provisions of the 1974 Penal Code. 6 Although the court has a
framework of rules created by statute 7 and case law 8 for dealing with
particularity and precision issues, application of these rules to individual
cases has raised numerous questions and reveals considerable disagreement over the proper construction of indictment standards.1' Thus, particularity and precision in indictments have become problematic areas of
Texas criminal procedure.
Procedurally, the dominant problem throughout the discussion of the
law relating to precision and particularity in indictments is whether or not
an alleged defect should be characterized as fundamental in nature." That
(on motion for rehearing) (argument that "unlawfully" sufficiently alleged omitted culpability rejected); Bosworth v. State, 510 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (omission of
phrase "corporeal personal property" immaterial where property otherwise accurately described); Sanders v. State, 402 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (use of "malice
aforethought" held equivalent of omitted term "voluntarily").
14. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
15. An example of the relative clarity and absence of controversy in indictment cases
which may be viewed strictly as involving problems of omission is the decision of Ex parte
Lewis, 544 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), in which the state's brief conceded fundamental error in an indictment for aggravated assault which failed to name the complaining
witness and failed to allege the "harm" element. Id. at 431.
16. See, e.g., Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en
banc) ("attempt" held broad enough to include "intent" in attempt indictment); Slavin v.
State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment fundamentally defective for
failure to allege specific intent embodied in separate definition of statutory element); Green
v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment not fundamentally
defective for failure to allege specific conduct).
17. See TEx. CODE CRIM. Po. ANN. arts. 21.01-.24 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1978); id. arts.
27.08-.09 (Vernon 1966).
18. See American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602-04 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
19. In at least three recent cases strong dissents have been voiced concerning sufficiency
of allegations in indictments. See Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (dissenting opinion) (disagreement as to need to allege intent in attempt indictment);
Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dissenting opinion on motion for
rehearing) (disagreement as to need to allege specific intent embodied within separate definition of element); Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dissenting
opinion) (disagreement as to need to allege specific conduct in attempt indictment).
20. Compare Richard v. State, 563 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (defect in
property description fundamental and properly raised for first time on appeal) and Bocanegra
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characterization is crucial because the court will permit a convicted defendant to challenge an indictment for the first time on appeal only when a
defect is of a substantive or fundamental nature.2
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT

The minimum procedural requirements that must be met by the accused
to successfully challenge the indictment for insufficient precision or particularity are determined by the degree of the alleged defect in precision22 or
particularity.n In connection with procedural requirements, the case of
American Plant Food Corp. v. State" is important to Texas indictment
law. Although American Plant Food did not change the law, the decision
is significant because it set forth the standards for classifying indictment
defects as either substantive and fundamental or as formal and waivable.15
If a defect in an essential averment is deemed so substantial as to fail to
charge an offense and thus to fail to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction,
the indictment is fundamentally defective and may be challenged for the
v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (defect in allegation of culpable mental
state fundamental and properly raised for first time on appeal) with Rhodes v. State, 560
S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (defect in property description not fundamental and not properly raised for first time on appeal) and Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d
378, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (defect in allegation of culpable mental state not fundamental and not properly raised for first time on appeal). See generally American Plant Food
Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S.
1098 (1975) (setting out test for determining nature of defect).
21. See American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602-04 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975). Compare Richard v. State, 563 S.W.2d 626,
626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (defect in property description fundamental and properly raised
for first time on appeal) with Rhodes v. State, 560 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(en banc) (defect in property description not fundamental and not properly raised for first
time on appeal). See also Banks v. State, 530 S.W.2d 940, 942 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)
(different question presented and different results when motion to quash filed in trial court).
In this comment it is assumed that a defect was raised for the first time on appeal whenever
the court does not state whether a motion to quash was filed at trial.
22. Compare Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 379-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (defect
in substitution of "attempt" for "intent" not fundamental and waived by failure to file
motion to quash in trial court) with Carpenter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (defect in substitution of "restrain" for "abduct" fundamental and properly raised for
first time on appeal).
23. Compare Richard v. State, 563 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (defect in
description of property as "merchandise" fundamental and properly raised for first time on
appeal) and Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (defect in description of property as "tires" fundamental and properly raised for first time on appeal) with
Rhodes v. State, 560 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (defect in description
of property as "wall panelling" not fundamental and waived by failure to file motion to quash
in trial court).
24. 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
25. See id. at 602-04.
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first time on appeal or at any time thereafter." In contrast, an averment

that is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction and support a conviction may be
defective for failure to give the accused notice of the precise charges against
him." A defect of this nature entitles the defendant to a new indictment,
but will be waived if not raised by exception or motion to quash in the trial
court.,

A further difference between claims asserting lack of jurisdiction and
those asserting insufficient notice is that assessment of fundamental defect
requires that the allegations be measured objectively against the statute,
whereas claims of insufficient notice involve examination of the allegations
from the perspective of the accused. 2 In both instances, however, the inquiry is to be directed to whether the offense is charged on the face of the
pleading in language sufficiently plain and intelligible to enable the accused to prepare his defense."0 Accordingly, it is improper to presume
awareness of the charges on the part of the accused. 3 The court has empha-

sized that testing the sufficiency of the pleading by what is charged in
writing complies with the intent of the Texas Constitution.2

26. Id. at 603. An information or indictment not challenged before conviction by exception or motion to quash may be attacked as fundamentally defective by post-conviction writ
of habeas corpus or on appeal from revocation of probation, as well as by direct appeal. See
Ex parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (habeas corpus); Standley v.
State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (revocation).
27. American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974),
appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975); see Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) (en banc).
28. American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974),
appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975); see Hughes v. State, 561 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (waiver of defect in name allegation); Rhodes v. State, 560 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (waiver of defect in property description).
29. See Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (en banc) (information); Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (concurring opinion)
(indictment).
30. See, e.g., Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (claim of
fundamental defect raised for first time on appeal); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523, 523 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (finding fundamental defect where motion to quash filed in trial court);
Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (notice claim raised by motion
to quash). See generally Tax. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 21.02(7) (Vernon 1966) (plain and
intelligible words); id. art. 21.04 (certainty required); id. art. 21.11 (sufficient certainty).
31. See, e.g., Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Moore v.
State, 532 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523, 523 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971). But see Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (using
"historical fact" of appellant's previous trial to satisfy "notice" requirement, although appellant claimed fundamental defect); Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (using appellant's awareness of state's theory in rejecting claim of fundamental defect);
Farmer v. State, 540 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (using appellant's stipulation
to satisfy "no notice of offense" claim raised for first time on appeal and finding no fundamental defect).
32. See, e.g., Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Moore v.
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FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT IN PARTICULARITY

The statutory requirement that an indictment allege every element that
must be proved33 is applicable to questions concerning particularity.,,
When the standard set forth in American Plant Food is applied to a claim
of insufficient particularity, an indictment will be fundamentally defective
if the statutory terms employed to allege an essential element 5 are too
general or conclusory,1 or fail to meet a particularity requirement imposed
by statute.31 A concern for whether it is sufficient to allege the elements of
State, 532 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971). See generally TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.
33. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1966).
34. See, e.g., Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (question of
alleging specific intent not included within definition of offense); Tave v. State, 546 S.W.2d
317, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (question of alleging under which of two statutes license was
suspended); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (question of alleging
facts constituting "fraud").
35. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(13) (Vernon 1974) (meaning of "element of an
offense"). Under the former and current Penal Codes, some disagreement has existed over
the question of what constitutes an essential element of an offense. In Victory v. State, 547
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the majority held that specific intent remains an essential
element when embodied in a definitional section apart from the definition of the offense. Id.
at 5 (on motion for rehearing). The dissent, however, held that specific intent is only a
definition when embodied in a separate definitional section. Id. at 5 (dissenting opinion on
motion for rehearing). Similarly, there was disagreement as to whether ownership was an
essential element of robbery under the former Penal Code. Compare Ex parte Jones, 542
S.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dissenting opinion) (not an essential element)
with Lucero v. State, 502 S.W.2d 128, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (essential element). Since
the former robbery statute did not mention ownership, that element could be classified as a
particularity issue as it is today. Compare Davis v. State, 532 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976) (robbery indictment under 1974 Penal Code not invalid upon motion to quash for
failure to allege elements of intended theft, including ownership) with Snow v. State, 156 Tex.
Crim. 49, 50, 238 S.W.2d 966, 967 (1951) (robbery indictment under former Penal Code
invalid upon motion to quash for failure to allege ownership in addition to following statute).
36. E.g., Tave v. State, 546 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (information for
driving vehicle with suspended license fundamentally defective for failure to allege under
which of two statutes license was suspended); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) (indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege facts that would constitute "fraud" charged); Burleson v. State, 429 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (perjury indictment fundamentally defective for failure to set out the allegedly false and true
facts); cf. Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590, 591-92, 595-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (on
motion for rehearing) (allegation in theft indictment that defendant "stole" property ineffective to allege essential elements of offense). But see Baldwin v. State, 538 SW.2d 109, 111
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (indictment for credit card abuse which
alleged defendant did "steal" not fundamentally defective for failure to allege elements of
theft involved). See also Foreman & Jones, Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code,
15 Hous. L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (1977) (severely criticizing Baldwin for failure to hold indictment
fundamentally defective).
37. See, e.g., Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege culpability under section 6.02(b) and (c)
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an offense in terms of the statute defining the offense pervades the approach to particularity problems. 8 Generally, it is considered sufficient to
allege an offense by tracking the language of the statute.3 ' This general
principle, however, is subject to the limitation that the statutory language
must describe every essential element of the offense."0 Situations exist in
which particularity requirements are not met merely by following the statute." One of these situations involves definitions of offenses which do not
specifically include one of the four culpable mental states recognized by
the Penal Code'" but for which one is nevertheless required.', Thus, in
Bocanegra v. State" the court held an information for welfare fraud fundamentally defective for failure to allege any of the culpable mental states
technically defined in the Penal Code.' 5 The requirement of alleging a
of Penal Code); Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment for
indecency with a child which failed to allege specific intent embodied in separate definition
of "sexual contact" fundamentally defective under article 21.05 of Code of Criminal Procedure); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (property description
fundamentally defective under article 21.09 of Code of Criminal Procedure); cf. Jones v.
State, 545 S.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (on motion for rehearing) (indictment
for passing forged instrument alleging, according to statute, passing "with intent to defraud"
not fundamentally defective for failure to allege defendant had knowledge). But see Pollard
v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (aggravated kidnapping indictment not
fundamentally defective under article 21.05 for failure to allege definition of "abduct" which
included particular intent).
38. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Rowl v. State, 547 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Johnson v.
State, 547 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977).
40. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. See generally Foreman & Jones,
Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. Rxv. 1, 5 n.21 (1977).
41. See, e.g., Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (information charging in language of statute fundamentally defective for failure to allege culpability
required by section 6.02 of Penal Code); Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege specific intent embodied
within separate definition of element); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (information fundamentally defective for failure to allege facts that would constitute
"fraud").

42.

See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 6.03 (Vernon 1974).

43. See Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 132-33 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (information for welfare fraud charging in language of statute that defendant acted "willfully" and
in "fraudulent" manner held fundamentally defective for failure to allege culpability required
by section 6.02 of Penal Code); Ex parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(indictment for type of burglary the definition of which did not specify culpable mental state
fundamentally defective for failure to allege culpability under section 6.02 of Penal Code).
See generally TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (Vernon 1974).
44. 552 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
45. Id. at 131. Bocanegra is especially interesting because, in rejecting the state's argument that the statutory words "willfully" and "fraudulent" are sufficient to allege culpability, the court indicates that the issues of particularity and precision will at times coincide in
a single challenge of an indictment or information. See id. at 131.
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culpable mental state not found in the definition of an offense has some
bearing upon the question of the need to allege specific intent, as illustrated by the case of Slavin v. State.'" In Slavin an indictment for indecency with a child was held fundamentally defective for failure to allege
the specific intent which separately defined the element of "sexual contact." 7
The indictment must also go beyond the language of the statute when a
criminal offense will not be charged unless the manner and means of doing
an act are sufficiently particularized.' 8 Thus, in Posey v. State'" the information was held fundamentally defective for failure to allege conduct that
would constitute the fraud charged." The manner and means principle is
especially relevant in the consideration of Green v. State"' and Williams
v. State,52 which concern the question of alleging the offense intended in a
criminal attempt. 3
The Problem of Alleging Specific Intent
Traditionally, the court has taken the position that an indictment need
not specifically allege the statutory definitions of terms used in setting out
the elements of an offense.8 Since the adoption of the 1974 Penal Code the
court has reiterated its adherence to this position," emphasizing that one
46. 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
47. Id. at 31. But see Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(aggravated kidnapping indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege particular intent defining "abduct"); cf. Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (on motion for rehearing) (indictment for credit card abuse not defective for failure to
allege elements, including particular intent, of theft which defined "steal" element).
48. E.g., Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (information
fundamentally defective for failure to allege facts that would constitute "fraud" charged);
Jasper v. State, 403 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (indictment for contributing to
minor's delinquency fundamentally defective for failure to particularize act which allegedly
constituted offense); Northern v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 511, 513, 203 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1947)
(murder indictment alleging defendant killed victim by "kicking and stomping" fundamentally defective for failure to allege means used). But cf. Eanes v. State, 546 S.W.2d 312, 313
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment for assault not fundamentally defective for failure to
allege manner and means used).
49. 545 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
50. See id. at 163.
51. 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
52. 544 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
53. Compare Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt
indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege statutory terms denoting constituent elements of attempted offense) with Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976) (attempt indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege specific acts
or conduct constituting alleged attempt).
54. See, e.g., Townsley v. State, 538 S.W.2d 411,412-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Austin
v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 268, 269, 312 S.W.2d 669, 669 (1958); Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim.
221, 225, 178 S.W. 337, 339 (1915).
55. E.g., Farmer v. State, 540 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Townsley v.
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of the purposes of the 1974 Penal Code was to dispense with any requirement of alleging statutory definitions of elements."
Considerable difficulty, however, has recently emerged with regard to
the test of fundamental defect in alleging elements which are separately

defined in terms of a specific or particular intent." The difficulty stems
largely from the judicial construction of article 21.05 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which requires that an indictment state a particular

intent where it is "a material fact in the description of the offense."" The
key decisions regarding the specific intent problem are Victory v. State"

and Slavin v.State." In each of those cases an indictment for indecency
with a child charging that the defendant did "knowingly and intentionally
engage in sexual contact" was held defective for failure to allege the
"intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire"'" which separately defined
the essential element of "sexual contact." 2 In Slavin, moreover, the court
held the defect to be fundamental. Both decisions employed the novel
reasoning that article 21.05 is applicable to an offense where an individual
State, 538 S.W.2d 411, 412-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 109,
112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing).
56. See Watson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Baldwin v. State,
538 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing).
57. Compare Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (aggravated
kidnapping indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege particular intent
defining "abduct" element) with Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(indictment for indecency with a child held fundamentally defective for failure to allege
particular intent defining "sexual contact" element) and Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (indictment for indecency with a child held
invalid upon motion to quash for failure to allege particular intent defining "sexual contact"
element).
58. TEx. CODE CraM. PRO.ANN. art. 21.05 (Vernon 1966). Compare Pollard v. State, 567
S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (aggravated kidnapping indictment not fundamentally
defective for failure to allege particular intent defining "abduct" element) and Moore v.
State, 160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954) (indictment, governed by predecessor to article 21.05, not defective although particular intent included within separate definition of element not alleged) with Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(indictment for indecency with a child fundamentally defective for failure to allege particular
intent separately defining "sexual contact" element) and Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (indictment for indecency with a child
invalid upon motion to quash for failure to allege particular intent separately defining "sexual
contact" element) and Worthington v. State, 469 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(indictment under former theft statute fundamentally defective under article 21.05 for failure
to allege element of "intent to deprive" embodied within definition of offense).
59. 547 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
60. 548 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
61. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(2) (Vernon 1974) (defining "sexual contact").
62. See Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Victory v. State,
547 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing). See generally Tax. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) (indecency with a child by sexual contact).
63. Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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element, rather than the offense itself, is defined in terms of a particular
intent." Under the provisions of the old and new Penal Codes, application
of the requirement imposed by article 21.05 had previously been limited
to instances where the intent was or is embodied within the definition of
the offense.' 5 In Victory the court emphasized that embodiment of the
intent element in a separate definition section does not eliminate the need
to allege that intent."
The holding in Slavin with regard to characterization of the defect as
7 In
fundamental is in implicit conflict with the case of Pollard v. State."
Pollard the court refused to hold an indictment for aggravated kidnapping
fundamentally defective for failure to allege the specific manner by which
the abduction was effected." The specific manner, contained in the separate definition of the essential element "abduct," includes the "intent to
prevent liberation."" Strict adherence to the rule established in Slavin
would have required the court in Pollard to hold the kidnapping indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege the particular intent by
which "abduct" is separately defined."0
Apparently, Victory and Slavin represent a trend toward requiring
greater particularity than has previously been the case. 7 It is difficult to
64. Compare Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment
fundamentally defective for failure to allege specific intent included within separate definition of element) and Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for
rehearing) (indictment invalid upon motion to quash for failure to allege specific intent
included within separate definition of element) with Worthington v.State, 469 S.W.2d 182,
183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (indictment under former theft statute fundamentally defective
under article 21.05 for failure to allege element "intent to deprive" embodied within definition
of offense).
65. CompareWorthington v. State, 469 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (indictment under former theft statute fundamentally defective under article 21.05 for failure to
allege element "intent to deprive" embodied within definition of offense) with Moore v. State,
160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954) (indictment, governed by predecessor to
article 21.05, not defective although particular intent included within separate definition of
"carrying away" element not alleged). See generally Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 399 (1954)
(predecessor to article 21.05).
66. See Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing). In one instance governed by the former Penal Code and the predecessor to article 21.05,
the reasoning used in Victory was not recognized and, as a consequence, the court did not
hold the indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege the intent embodied within
a separate definition. See Moore v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954)
(element of "carrying away" in article 1379 of former Penal Code separately defined by
particular intent); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 399 (1954) (predecessor to article 21.05).
67. 567 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
68. Id. at 11, 13.
69. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.01(2) (Vernon 1974).
70. See Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
71. Compare Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment
held fundamentally defective under article 21.05 for failure to allege particular intent included within separate definition of element) with Worthington v. State, 469 S.W.2d 182, 183
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determine whether the wording of article 21.05 is more consistent with
limiting the statute's application to cases in which a particular intent is
embodied in the definition of an offense7" or with the expanded application
established by Victory and Slavin.11 The court has not yet been confronted
with other instances of indictments or informations concerning offenses
having an element separately defined in terms of a particular intent. Such
offenses include incest,7" theft of services by deception,75 forgery by possession,7" solicitation of a child," and possibly prostitution." Historically,
some of these offenses have predecessors which included an element of
particular intent within the definition of the offense." Some of the elements, however, which are now separately defined in terms of particular
intent, had no counterpart in the former Penal Code.'" The element of
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (indictment under former theft statute fundamentally defective

under article 21.05 for failure to allege intent element embodied within definition of offense)
and Moore v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954) (indictment, governed by predecessor to article 21.05, not defective although particular intent embodied
within separate definition of "carrying away" element not alleged).
72. Compare Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (article 21.05
of Code of Criminal Procedure not applied to require pleading of particular intent embodied
in separate definition of essential element) and Moore v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268
S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954) (predecessor to article 21.05 not applied, although particular intent
embodied in separate definition of essential element) with Worthington v. State, 469 S.W.2d
182, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (indictment under former theft statute fundamentally defective under article 21.05 for failure to allege particular intent embodied within definition of
offense).
73. See Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (article 21.05 applied
to render fundamentally defective indictment which failed to allege particular intent embodied within separate definition of essential element); Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (article 21.05 applied to render invalid upon
motion to quash indictment which failed to allege particular intent embodied within separate
definition of essential element).
74. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02(a) (Vernon 1974) (incest); id. § 25.02(b)(1)
(deviate sexual intercourse defined for purposes of incest).
75. See id. § 21.01(2) (sexual contact defined for purposes of solicitation of a child); id.
§ 25.06(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (solicitation of a child).
76. See id. § 31.01(2)(E) (Vernon 1974) (deception defined for purposes of theft by
deception); id. § 31.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (theft by deception).
77. See id. § 32.21(a)(1)(C) (Vernon 1974) (forging by possession defined for purposes
of forgery); id. § 32.21(b) (forgery).
78. See id. § 43.01(3) (sexual contact defined for purposes of prostitution); id. § 43.01
(4) (sexual conduct defined for purposes of prostitution); id. § 43.02(a)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp.
1978) (prostitution).
79. One such offense is indecency with a child. Compare id. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 1974)
(indecency with a child) with Tex. Penal Code art. 535d, § 1 (1952) (fondling). Another
example is forgery by possession. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(C) (Vernon
1974) with Tex. Penal Code art. 998 (1961).
80. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02(b)(1) (Vernon 1974) (definition of deviate
sexual intercourse for purposes of incest) and id. § 43.01(3) (definition of sexual contact for
purposes of prostitution) with Tex. Penal Code arts. 496, 497 (1952) (incest) and id. art.
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"abduct" that was involved in the Pollard aggravated kidnapping indictment is one of these new elements.8' In contrast, the definition of "sexual
contact" involved in the Victory and Slavin cases is derived from the
"lascivious intent" element of the fondling statute contained in the former
Penal Code.8" Whether this historical difference contributed to the different results reached in Slavin and Pollardon the question of fundamental
defect is purely a matter of conjecture. In any case, how strictly and consistently the rule laid down in Slavin will be applied remains to be seen.
One solution to the questions surrounding the sufficient pleading of
specific intent that defines an essential element would be a legislative
revision of article 21.05 to clarify the scope of its application to offenses
under the 1974 Penal Code. Until such a revision is made, it is imperative
that a uniform policy be followed with regard to the pleading of elements
separately defined by a particular intent. An alternative to the strict standard of fundamental defect established by Slavin would be holding an
indictment which fails to allege a separately defined intent invalid upon
motion to quash" but not fundamentally defective. Two arguments can be
advanced in support of this compromise alternative. The first of these
involves reference to the conclusion by the court in Victory that allegation
of the general culpable mental state "knowingly and intentionally" does
not dispense with the requirement of alleging a particular intent.8' The
Penal Code, however, allows intent, knowledge, or recklessness to establish
criminal responsibility where the culpability is not prescribed in the
"definition of the offense."" The definition of indecency with a child which
specifically involves sexual contact does not prescribe a culpable mental
state." Thus, the Slavin indictment, which alleged that the defendant did
"knowingly and intentionally engage in sexual contact"" meets the minimum substantive requirements imposed by the Penal Code and should not
be fundamentally defective. A second, more far-reaching, conclusion
607(20) (prostitution). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(2)(E) (Vernon 1974) (definition

of deception for purposes of theft by deception).
81. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.01(2) (Vernon 1974) (definition of abduct for
purposes of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping) with Tex. Penal Code art. 1177 (1961)
(kidnapping). The use of a particular intent in the definition of kidnapping for extortion in
the former Penal Code has been carried forward into the definition of aggravated kidnapping
for ransom or reward in the 1974 Penal Code. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)(1)
(Vernon 1974) with Tex. Penal Code art. 1177a (1961).
82. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(2) (Vernon 1974) (sexual contact defined
for purposes of indecency with a child) with Tex. Penal Code art. 535d, § 1 (1952) (fondling).
83. See Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing).
84. See id. at 4.
85.

See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b), (c) (Vernon 1974).

86. Compare id. § 21.11(a)(1) (indecency with a child by sexual contact) with id. §
21.11(a)(2) (indecency with a child "knowing the child is present, with intent to arouse").
87. See Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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emerges from this argument as well as from decisions involving the particular intent problem: when a particular intent is separated from the definition of an offense it is a "material fact in the description of the offense,",8
which must be alleged upon timely objection in the trial court, but it is
89
not an essential element of the offense.
The Problem of Alleging CriminalAttempt
Another source of uncertainty in the area of particularity stems from the
different positions taken by the court with regard to the necessity of alleging the specific conduct or acts constituting criminal attempt." The court
held in Williams v. State"'that an indictment for criminal attempt is not
fundamentally defective for failure to allege the statutory terms denoting
the constituent elements of the attempted or intended offense." In
Williams the attempted burglary was sufficiently charged by alleging that
the defendant attempted to commit burglary by "prying a door latch with
a steel meathook. '"13 That allegation, therefore, set out the specific act done
in the attempt to commit the intended offense. Williams should be compared with the case of Green v. State," decided earlier the same year. In
Green it was held that an indictment for criminal attempt is not fundamentally defective for failure to allege the specific acts or conduct furnishing the basis for a criminal attempt prosecution. The indictment in Green
for attempted burglary tracked the burglary statute." No specific act,
88. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 21.05 (Vernon 1966).
89. See Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (indictment not
fundamentally defective for failure to allege particular intent embodied in separate definition
of essential element); Moore v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 183, 184, 268 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1954)
(indictment, governed by predecessor to article 21.05, not defective although particular intent
embodied in separate definition of essential element not alleged).
90. Compare Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt
indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege statutory terms denoting constit.
uent elements of attempted offense) with Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976) (attempt indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to allege specific acts
or conduct constituting alleged attempt).
91. 544 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
92. Id. at 430.
93. Id. at 429. Williams adopted the same reasoning previously applied to.other offenses
committed with intent Lo commit some other offense or committed in the course of committing some offense. See id. at 429-30; Gonzales v. State, 517 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975) (burglary); Earl v. State, 514 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (robbery); Small
v. State, 466 S.W.2d 281, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (assault with intent to commit rape).
See also Colman v. State, 542 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment
not fundamentally defective for omission of phrase "amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended").
94. 533 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
95. Id. at 770.
96. See id. at 770.
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however, comparable to the "prying" allegation present in the Williams
indictment was alleged. 7 To reach its conclusion, the court in Green found
it necessary to overrule the earlier case of Fonville v. State," which had
established the requirement of alleging specific acts constituting the attempt." The result of the Williams and Green decisions is to allow alternative means for alleging the offense intended in a criminal attempt.'0 Thus,
an attempt indictment will not be fundamentally defective if it alleges
either the constituent statutory elements of the intended offense 0' or the
02
specific conduct underlying the attempt.
Clearly, the result in Williams is more satisfactory than that of Green,
as it adheres more closely to the statutory definition of criminal attempt. 03
An essential element of that offense is that the accused "does an act
amounting to more than mere preparation."'0 4 In a prosecution for criminal
attempt, the attempt is the primary offense, or legal conclusion, and
should be supported by allegations describing the specific conduct with a
certain degree of factual particularity. 5 Criminal attempt is similar to
situations in which the specific manner and means of doing the proscribed
97. See id. at 770.
98. 62 S.W. 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901).
99. Id. at 573.
100. Compare Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment which alleges specific conduct not fundamentally defective for failure to
allege constituent elements of attempted offense) with Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment which alleges constituent elements of attempted
offense not fundamentally defective for failure to allege specific conduct). See also Ex parte
Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing) (dictum)
(burglary indictment may allege entry with intent to commit theft or named felony, or may
allege elements of felony or theft intended); Williams v. State, 505 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (burglary indictment charging act done with intent to commit "felony"
fundamentally defective for failure to allege elements of "felony" intended).
101. See Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
102. See Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
103. See id. at 429-30. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides:
"A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act
amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of
the offense intended."
104. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Baldwin v.
State, 538 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (considering "an act amounting to more
than mere preparation" as distinct element of attempt).
105. See Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dissenting opinion); cf. Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment fundamentally defective for failure to allege facts that would constitute "fraud" charged); Jasper v.
State, 403 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (indictment for contributing to minor's
delinquency fundamentally defective for failure to particularize act alleged to constitute
offense). See generally Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 384-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en
banc) (concurring opinion) (prohibition against alleging mere conclusions); Foreman &Jones,
Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. Rxv. 1, 6 (1977) (prohibition
against alleging mere conclusions).
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conduct must be particularized in order to allege an offense." 6 Tracking
the elements of the attempted offense without any description of specific
acts or conduct, as was the case in Green, should render the indictment
1 Conversely, the Williams decision is in accord
fundamentally defective. 07
with other cases involving acts done with the intent to commit a named
offense;'"0 the court held that a criminal attempt indictment which alleges
the constituent elements of the primary offense, attempt, is not fundamentally defective for failure to track the constituent elements of the offense
attempted.'"
FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT IN PRECISION

When the issue of precision in indictments or informations is before the
court, the state benefits from case law"' and numerous statutes"' that
manifest a policy of liberal construction of the words used to allege the
terms representing the elements of offenses. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows the substitution of synonyms and equivalents in place of the
exact statutory words"' and also allows the use of general terms for special
or particular terms."' Significantly, however, the liberal policy is limited
by the principle that it is not permissible to make substitutions for words
which have acquired a technical meaning."' In addition, it must be noted
106. Compare Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment
fundamentally defective for failure to allege facts that would constitute "fraud" charged) and
Jasper v. State, 403 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (indictment for contributing to
minor's delinquency fundamentally defective for failure to particularize act alleged to constitute offense) with Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) ("an act amounting
to more than mere preparation" is element of attempt).
107. See cases and materials cited note 105 supra.
108. See Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt);
Gonzales v. State, 517 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (burglary); Earl v. State, 514
S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (robbery); Small v. State, 466 S.W.2d 281, 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (assault with intent to commit rape).
109. See Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The question whether an indictment for an offense committed with intent to commit some other
offense is voidable upon motion to quash was answered in the negative in the case of Davis
v. State, 532 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (aggravated robbery).
110. See Butler v. State, 551 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (subject matter
and context in which Words used should be considered); Watson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 676,
678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (relying on articles 21.12 and 21.17 of Code of Criminal Procedure
to uphold indictment); McClane v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 603, 606, 343 S.W.2d 447, 449 (1960)
(allowing substitution of equivalent words).
111. See Code Construction Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 2.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); Tax. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 21.12, .17 (Vernon 1966).
112. See Tax. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 21.17 (Vernon 1966).
113. See id. art. 21.12.
114. See Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (on
motion for rehearing); Code Construction Act, TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 2.01
(Vernon Supp. 1978) ("words and phrases" having "technical or particular meaning ... shall
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that the court does not automatically approve the use of non-statutory
words simply because the statutory words do not have a technical meaning." 5 Thus, in the case of Hobbs v. State"' an indictment for attempted
capital murder for remuneration was held fundamentally defective on the
ground that the words "promise to pay" could not be equated with the
statutory term "employs.""' 7
Another aspect of the precision issue involves situations where use of the
statutory terms to allege an essential element nevertheless leaves what
may be described as ambiguity in the indictment.1 8 Often, the ambiguity
is created by grammatical or syntactical errors in alleging an element."'
The court's willingness to consider the subject matter and context in which
words are used20 will often prevent such errors from causing an indictment
to be fundamentally defective.' At times, however, an ambiguity will be
considered sufficiently serious to constitute fundamental defect. 22
be construed accordingly"); cf. Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) ("willfully" and "fraudulent" not equivalent to any culpable mental state recognized
in Penal Code); Carpenter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 724, 725-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (kidnapping indictment substituting "restrain" for "abduct" held fundamentally defective). But see
Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) ("attempt" held
broad enough to include "intent" in indictment for attempted murder despite technical
definitions given to each term); cf. Watson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (rape indictment not fundamentally defective for using general terms "force" and
"threats" in place of special statutory definitions of those terms).
115. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 548 SW.2d 884, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (allegation
of "promise to pay" not equivalent to "employ"); Carter v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 614, 615,
27 S.W.2d 821, 822 (1930) (allegation of "unlawfully and willingly" not equivalent to "willfully"); Barthelow v. State, 26 Tex. 175, 178 (1862) (allegation of "unlawfully, voluntarily,
and unjustly" not the equivalent of "willfully").
116. 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
117. Id. at 886.
118. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 517 S.W.2d 554,, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (omission
of "did" not fundamental defect where "made" could be read for "make"); Linton v. State,
452 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (omission of "to" following "intent" not fundamental defect); McCann v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 383, 383-84, 328 S.W.2d 298, 298 (1959)
(alleging "without the consent ...

and the intent

. . .

to deprive" could be construed only

as allegation that defendant took without intent to deprive) (court's emphasis).
119. See cases cited note 118 supra.
120. Butler v. State, 551 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); see Linton v. State,
452 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (omission of a word not fatal if certainty and
meaning not affected); Dawson v. State, 33 Tex. 492, 504 (1870) ("awkward use of words...
and clumsy construction of . . . sentences" does not render indictment "bad").
121. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 551 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Terry v.
State, 517 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Linton v. State, 452 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970).
122. See Agnew v. State, 474 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (allegation of
"intent" present but misplaced in indictment); McCann v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 383, 38384, 328 S.W.2d 298, 298 (1959) (information alleging "without the consent. . . and the intent
• . . to deprive" could be construed only as allegation that defendant took without intent to
deprive) (court's emphasis).
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The Problem of Alleging Specific Intent
A significant controversy involving a question of precision has arisen
regarding the apparent trend to relax the standard of jurisdictional sufficiency in the pleading of the "intent" element.'23 The trend is exemplified
by the recent case of Dovalina v. State.' 4 In Dovalina a plurality of the
court held that an indictment for attempted murder was not fundamentally defective for failure to specifically allege that the attempt was made
with "intent" to commit murder.' 8 This result was reached even though
the language, "with specific intent to commit an offense," is part of the
statutory definition of criminal attempt. 2 '
The plurality in Dovalinarelied heavily on Lucero v. State'" in concluding that the word "attempt" is broad enough to include "intent. "'' 2 It
appears, however, that reliance on Lucero was misplaced because that case
is distinguishable from Dovalina on two closely related grounds. First, the
Lucero case was not governed by the 1974 Penal Code, which now defines
"attempt" and "intent" in technical terms. 2 ' The court has recently reaffirmed the well established rule prohibiting substitutions for words which
have acquired a technical meaning.2 0 Thus, the meaning of "attempt" now
seems to diverge too significantly from that of "intent" to be considered a
3
permissible substitute for the latter. '
Similarly, article 21.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows
the use in indictments of general terms which embrace "special or particular terms,"' 2 is now inapplicable to the use of "attempt" in place of
123. See Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc);
Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977) (on motion for rehearing).
124. 564 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
125. Id. at 380-81; accord, Telfair v. State, 565 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978)
(en banc) (on motion for rehearing).
126. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978); cf. Colman v. State,
542 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment which omitted phrase
"amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect" not fundamentally
defective where specific conduct was sufficiently alleged).
127. 502 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973) (indictment under former Penal Code
for assault with intent to commit robbery not fundamentally defective when "attempt"
substituted for "intent").
128. See Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978) (en banc). But
cf. Ex parte Winton, 549 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977) (burglary indictment
alleging defendant "therein attempted to commit ... theft" fundamentally defective for
omission of culpable mental state) (emphasis added).
129. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (intent); id. § 15.01(a) (attempt) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
130. See Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978) (en banc) (on
motion for rehearing).
131. See notes 126-130 supra and accompanying text. But see Dovalina v. State, 564
S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978) (en banc) (meaning of "attempt" and "intent" have
not changed with adoption of new Penal Code).
132. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 21.12 (Vernon 1966) provides: "When a statute
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"intent," since "attempt" is no longer a general term, but rather a "special
or particular term."'33 Moreover, in contrast to the liberal practice that
prevailed under the former Penal Code, 3 the exclusive and technical definitions of culpable mental states, including intent, set out in the 1974
Penal Code'35 appear to preclude the use of alternative terms to allege the
required culpability. 3 In addition, article 21.17, which allows the use of
words similar in meaning to statutory words, 3 should not support the
allegation of "intent" by the use of "attempt." This conclusion is required
because the separate statutory definitions of "intent" and "attempt" do
not suggest any similarity of meaning between the two terms.'38
The second factor which indicates misplaced reliance upon Lucero by
the court in Dovalina is that the offense in Lucero was not criminal attempt, but rather assault with intent to commit robbery.' 31 Under the 1974
Penal Code "attempt" is the legal conclusion that must be reached to
support a conviction.4 0 "Attempt," therefore, should not be confused with
"intent," which, as a strong dissent in Dovalina emphasized, is one of the
essential elements to be proved in reaching that conclusion., The
Dovalina decision appears even more questionable in view of the provision
in the Code of Criminal Procedure addressed to indictments for acts done
defining an offense uses special or particular terms, indictment on it may use the general term
which, in common language, embraces the special term."
133. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (attempt).
134. Cases decided under the former Penal Code varied in the latitude with which terms
of culpability could be alleged. Compare Huggins v. State, 544 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976) (indictment charging "unlawfully" fundamentally defective for failure to allege
"willfully") with Sanders v. State, 402 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (use of
"malice aforethought" held equivalent of "voluntarily" in murder indictment).
135. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon 1974).
136. See Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (on
motion for rehearing) ("unlawfully" not equivalent to "knowingly," partly because impermissible to substitute for technical words); Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) (information for welfare fraud charging in language of statute that defendant
acted "willfully" and in "fraudulent" manner held fundamentally defective for failure to
allege required culpability). See generally Foreman & Jones, Indictments Under The New
Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1977).
137. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 21.17 (Vernon 1966) states: "Words used in a
statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to
use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory
words."
138. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (intent) with id. §
15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (attempt).
139. See Lucero v. State, 502 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
140. See Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)
(concurring opinion); id. at 387 (dissenting opinion); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
141. See Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)

(dissenting opinion);

TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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with intent to commit some other offense,' and the provision requiring
indictments to state a particular intent where it is "a material fact in the
4 3
description of the offense.'
The reasoning in the foregoing discussion of Dovalina is equally applicable to Hobbs v. State.' In Hobbs an indictment for attempted capital
murder for remuneration was held fundamentally defective on the ground
that the allegation of a "promise to pay" was not equivalent to an averment that the defendant "employed" another to commit murder, as specifically required by the capital murder statute.'45 On rehearing, however, the
court concluded that the indictment was sufficient to allege the offense of
criminal solicitation.'46 Criminal solicitation is similar to criminal attemptbecause it requires that the solicitation be made "with intent that a
capital felony or felony of the first degree be committed."'47 The court in
Hobbs held that the "intent" essential to a solicitation was sufficiently
alleged by the averment that the defendant did "attempt knowingly" to
cause the victim's death.' Insofar as "attempt" is now a separate, general
offense, 4 ' the approval by Hobbs of an "attempt" allegation in a solicitation indictment allows the name and legal conclusion of one kind of offense
to be substituted in the pleading of a wholly independent offense. In addition, since the 1974 Penal Code assigns dissimilar technical definitions to
"knowingly" and to "intent,"'" the use of "knowingly" in a solicitation
indictment is not the equivalent of an "intent" allegation. 5' Furthermore,
the holding in Hobbs, like Dovalina, ignores the strict requirements imposed by statute on the pleading of specific intent.'52
The resolution of the problems raised in Dovalina and Hobbs lies in a
142. TEX. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 21.13 (Vernon 1966) provides: "An indictment for
an act done with intent to commit some other offense may charge in general terms the
commission of such act with intent to commit such other offense."
143. Id. art. 21.05.
144. 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
145. Id. at 886.
146. Id. at 887 (on motion for rehearing). The conviction was nevertheless reversed
because the state did not specify its reliance on the solicitation theory in the indictment itself.
See id. at 887-88.
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (solicitation) (emphasis added).
Compare id. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (attempt) with id. § 15.03(a) (Vernon 1974)
(solicitation).
148. Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (on motion for rehearing). Although this apparent error in the Hobbs indictment was not raised by the appellant,
the court considered it in a cursory way on its own motion. See id. at 887; TEx. CODE CRIM.
PRO. ANN. art. 40.09(13) (Vernon 1966) (unassigned error considered in the interest of justice).

149.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

150. Compare id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (intent) with id. § 6.03(b) (knowingly).
151. Cf. Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on motion for
rehearing) (allegation of general culpable mental state "knowingly and intentionally" does

not dispense with need to allege particular intent).
152.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 21.05, .13 (Vernon 1966).
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more careful scrutiny of the meanings that the 1974 Penal Code now as53
signs to individual terms such as "attempt," "intent," and "knowingly."'
The recognition of the independence of such terms from one another should
result in a more orderly determination of sufficient precision in indictments and informations.
CONCLUSION

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has the framework of statutory
and court-made rules within which to achieve uniformity in determining
when an indictment should be held fundamentally defective for lack of
particularity or precision.' 54 Presently, considerable dissatisfaction may be
felt as a result of the court's tendencies to miscontrue the standards provided by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and by the court itself.
With regard to the issue of precision, decisions such as Dovalinaand Hobbs
indicate a failure to grasp the limitations now imposed upon a policy of
liberal construction by the articulation of technical definitions in the 1974
Penal Code. In the area of particularity, no one would suggest that the
court should revert to a standard so strict that an indictment would be
fundamentally defective for failure to specifically allege that the "kicking
and stomping" were done with one's "feet with shoes on."'55 The elimination in Green, however, of the need to allege the specific acts or conduct
underlying an alleged criminal attempt stands as another example of the
court's difficulties with certain procedural requirements implied
by the
5.
Code.'
Penal
1974
the
in
embodied
substantive definitions
153. See generally TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974) (intent); id. § 6.03(b)
(knowingly); id. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (attempt).
154. See American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602-04 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975); Code Construction Act, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEx. CODE CrIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 21.01-.24
(Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1978); id. arts. 27.08-,09 (Vernon 1966).
155. See Northern v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 511, 512-13, 203 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1947).
156. See Green v. State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The importance
of being alert to the differences between provisions in the former Penal Code and the corresponding versions in the 1974 Penal Code is indicated by the case of Lewis v. State, 527
S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). In Lewis the offense, robbery by firearms, was governed
by the former Penal Code. Id. at 534. An essential element of the offense was that a person
"fraudulently take from the person or possession of another any property ....
Tex. Penal
Code art. 1408 (1953). The indictment charged, in the language of the 1974 Penal Code, that
the robbery was committed "in the course of committing theft." Lewis v. State, 527 S.W.2d
533, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). This language was held sufficient to allege the "fraudulent
taking" on the ground that "theft" was formerly defined as a "fraudulent taking." Id. at 53435; see Tex. Penal Code art. 1410 (1953). In the 1974 Penal Code, however, "in the course of
committing theft" does not require the actual commission of theft. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 29.01(1) (Vernon 1974). An actual "fraudulent taking," therefore, is not necessarily committed as part of a robbery under the new robbery statute. As the Lewis case was governed by
the old statute, substitution of the new terminology may have resulted in failure to allege a
robbery.
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These decisions are unsettling because inherent in any further liberalization of indictment standards'57 is the risk of putting changeable and subjective notions of justice ahead of certain and objective principles. One unsuccessful legislative attempt to modify the standards of criminal pleading
would have completely eliminated the right to challenge the sufficiency of
an indictment for the first time on appeal. 5 ' As one commentary has
pointed out, such legislation would have run afoul of the constitutional
requirement that an indictment inform the accused of the nature of the
charges against him. 5 '
The decision in Slavin contrasts with the court's tendencies to relax
standards of pleading. Slavin may have unnecessarily raised the standard
of sufficient particularity for the pleading of particular intent which is
embodied in separate definitions of essential elements. Clearly, that decision demonstrates that analysis of the relationship between the 1974 Penal
Code and established standards of indictment sufficiency has resulted in
the adoption of stricter, as well as more liberal standards.
The immediate task facing the court on issues of indictment sufficiency
is to make a more careful discrimination among the elements of offenses
as they are delineated in the 1974 Penal Code to determine which defects
in allegations should properly be considered fundamental. The successful
completion of this task will require a willingness on the part of the court
to better integrate the substantive and procedural aspects of Texas criminal jurisprudence.
157. See Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (dissenting
opinion) (proposing enactment of legislation limiting right to challenge indictment which
"substantially charges an offense"); H.B. 1403, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (1977), quoted in
Foreman & Jones, Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. Rlv. 1, 14-15
n.79 (1977).
158. See H.B. 1403, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (1977), quoted in Foreman & Jones,
Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L. REv. 1, 14-15 n.79 (1977).
159. Foreman & Jones, Indictments Under The New Texas Penal Code, 15 Hous. L.
REv. 1, 14-15 n.79 (1977). See also TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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WORDS TO INDICT BY

In the name and by authority of Levity:
Many things thought of in terms of Omission
Could better be viewed as lack of Precision.'
Frequently, also, an Indictment may fail
If it lacks Particularityor, in other words, detail.'
To allege that "Attempt" is what's been committed,
It's not Fatal Defect if "Intent" is omitted.3
The easiest way to end this confusion
Is to realize "Attempt" is just a Conclusion.'
If "Intent" should, however, be part of an Element,
It must be alleged and there might be no equivalent.5
For "Attempt" it's essential to know what's been done;
But a statement of acts is no better than none.
A recent example of Indictment held Void
Is where "promise" was used, instead of "employed. '
Toward liberal construction the court often leans,
Except for Mens Rea and "Manner and Means.
When indicting for Crime it's still good advice
To make Allegations Particularand Precise.
"

1. See Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 813-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (on motion for
rehearing) (rejecting argument that "unlawfully" sufficiently alleged culpable mental state).
2. See Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (necessary to go
beyond statutory language).

3. Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (on motion for
rehearing).
4. See id. at 387 (dissenting opinion on motion for rehearing).
5. See Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). But see Pollard v.
State, 567 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
6. Compare Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt
indictment not fundamentally defective for failure to track offense attempted) with Green v.
State, 533 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (attempt indictment not fundamentally
defective for failure to allege specific conduct).
7. Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
8. See Bocanegra v. State, 552 S.W.2d 130,131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (mens rea); Posey
v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (manner and means).
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